It is also worth remembering that compute isolation is only half the problem. You can put code inside a gVisor sandbox or a Firecracker microVM with a hardware boundary, and none of it matters if the sandbox has unrestricted network egress for your “agentic workload”. An attacker who cannot escape the kernel can still exfiltrate every secret it can read over an outbound HTTP connection. Network policy where it is a stripped network namespace with no external route, a proxy-based domain allowlist, or explicit capability grants for specific destinations is the other half of the isolation story that is easy to overlook. The apply case here can range from disabling full network access to using a proxy for redaction, credential injection or simply just allow listing a specific set of DNS records.
FirstFT: the day's biggest stories
。关于这个话题，safew官方下载提供了深入分析
We'll take a 25x speedup
Овечкин продлил безголевую серию в составе Вашингтона09:40
据乌克兰国际文传电讯社2月27日消息，乌克兰总统泽连斯基在接受英国天空新闻频道采访时说，如果俄罗斯近期不同意举行乌美俄三方元首会晤，俄乌冲突将会“旷日持久”。